Despite the enormous growth in Islamic banking over the last thirty years, most studies, using DEA/stochastic frontier analysis, have found Islamic banks are either as productive or less productive than conventional banks. We take advantage of recent improvements in the direct estimation of production functions by Olley-Pakes and Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer (ACF) to develop fresh evidence on this question. Production functions are estimated and productivity calculated for conventional and Islamic banks in Bahrain and Malaysia between 1990 and 2011. We nd that although in many respects the dierent techniques yield similar results, the ACF results are more plausible.
Introduction
Over the last thirty years there has been enormous growth in Islamic banking. Originally, Islamic banks operated almost exclusively in Muslim countries to meet the need of Muslims for Shari'ah compliant nancial products. Now there are Islamic banks operating in over 50 countries, including the major non-Muslim developed economies. And they now compete with non-Islamic banks for the business of non-Muslim customers. Because ethical principles restrict the operating methods and types of business an Islamic bank can engage in, simple economic theory suggests Islamic banks would tend to be less productive than conventional banks, which makes their rise puzzling and raises concerns about their sustainability. Furthermore, most previous empirical analyses of this question is consistent with this prediction. However, the relative productivity of Islamic banking remains an open question for three reasons. First, there are two theoretical arguments that suggest this may not be the case. First, Islamic banks are producing a dierentiated product valued by customers. Second, the restrictions under which Islamic banks operate may be an alternative solution to the asymmetric information problems, that the Global Financial Crisis reminds us, are endemic in even regulated conventional banking. The second main reason why the relative productivity of Islamic banking remains an open question is that most previous empirical work on this question uses the same tools of DEA\Stochastic frontier analysis. Furthermore many of these studies are based on either relatively old datasets or datasets constructed by pooling data across dierent markets and dierent regulatory environments. However, new approaches to the direct estimation of productivity \setvia production functions are being used extensively in industrial organization and international trade, but have not been applied to this question. Thirdly, in Malaysia, and to some extent elsewhere, Islamic banking services are increasingly delivered by mixed banks which provide both conventional and Islamic banking. These institutions have not been considered explicitly in the literature.
Hence, in this paper we provide new estimates of the productivity of conventional and Islamic banking for banks operating in two of the international hubs of Islamic banking:
Bahrain and Malaysia. We use an unbalanced panel of 74 banks operating between 1990 and 2011 to estimate production functions using standard OLS and xed eects estimators as well as the more recently developed Olley-Pakes and Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer (ACF) approaches.
The latter approaches feature increasingly sophisticated techniques to overcome endogeneity of inputs as well as stronger identication of parameters. To determine the robustness of our ndings, we estimate separate production functions by country and by type of bank as well as using a pooled sample. We calculate bank level productivity and compare both the levels and growth of Islamic, conventional and mixed banks in Bahrain and Malaysia.
Averages at dierent levels from nations to individual banks are compared with a particular focus on developments around mixed banks. We nd that the ACF estimator is preferred on both a priori grounds as well as in terms of the outcomes yielding more plausible estimates of economies of scale and productivity. However, all four approaches yield broadly similar outcomes in that Islamic banks tend to have lower total factor productivity in terms of levels but have greater growth rates. Furthermore, in Malaysia, mixed banks tend to have a higher average total factor productivity and, once they begin oering Islamic banking services, tend to grow at a similar rate or faster than Islamic banks. Growth rates of conventional banks are almost identical across Malaysia and Bahrain.
These results are important for three reasons. First, in the rst application of the OP approach to estimating the productivity of Islamic banking and the rst application of the ACF approach to banking per se, we demonstrate these techniques can provide plausible and useful estimates. Second, using these new approaches nevertheless conrms the conclusions reached by using older techniques: Islamic banks tend to be less productive than conventional banks though we also show the gap is narrowing. In two markets that feature both substantial numbers of conventional and Islamic banks, the distribution of productivities for conventional banks looks quite similar. However, Islamic banks in Malaysia tend to be more productive than Islamic banks in Bahrain. Finally, we demonstrate how banks that provide both Islamic and conventional banking services tend to be more productive and, in Malaysia, have more rapid productivity growth than conventional banks or strictly Islamic banks. This seems a promising way to meet the increasing demand for Islamic banking services.
In the next section, we address the question as to why productivity might dier between Islamic and conventional banks and review the previous literature on comparing productivity across Islamic and conventional banks. In the third section, we review the Olley-Pakes and Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer approaches to directly estimating production functions, concluding with a brief review of the literature in which these and related techniques have been applied. Section four reviews the data, its descriptive statistics and outlines an estimation strategy.
The fth section reports the results for estimating production functions and analyses the implied estimates of productivity. Section six concludes.
2 Why might productivity dier between Islamic and conventional banks?
In this section we rst summarise the nature of Islamic banks. This is followed by a comparision with conventional banks and the implications of the dierences for outcomes when Islamic and conventional banks compete in the same market. In the nal subsection we discuss previous research analysing the eciency of Islamic banks compared with conventional banks 2.1 What are Islamic banks?
Islamic banks are banks that operate consistently with Islamic laws, often known as Shari'ah as derived from the Quran and Sunnah (Ahmed, 2011) . The main objectives of Islamic laws are to protect wellbeing and avoid any harm. Thus moral values and ethical conduct is a must in Islamic banking operations. Islamic banks were established about four decades ago to meet the mandatory needs for Muslims in facilitating their nancial activities. The early motivation for the creation of Islamic banks was to mainly capture the market of Muslims rather than compete with existing conventional banks. Despite this motivation, the development and massive growth of Islamic banking throughout the world has led to a more competitive market in banking. The initial intention in fullling the need of Muslims to have Shari'ah compliant products has been replaced with aiming to provide attractive and competitive products that suit both Muslims and Non-Muslims.
The primary application of Shari'ah to banking is the prohibition of unlawful conduct so to ensure fair and equitable treatment for all stakeholders. Thus it is very important in Islamic banking operation to ensure the total elimination of riba, gharar and maisir. Riba refers to unequal trade of values in exchange, which commonly includes interest. Riba or the involvement of interest in any Islamic banking transaction is strictly prohibited as it may become a burden to the less capable (nancially) party. Therefore, to replace the use of interest, Islamic banks apply the concept of Prot and Loss Sharing (PLS) to protect both banks and customers. At the same time, Islamic banks still earn a reasonable prot at an agreeable price. The specic arrangements are very much dependent on the type of contract between the two parties. For example, capital and the prot (or loss) proportion is predetermined in the contract such as a split of 70 and 30 percent between the two parties, such as the bank and the funds provider. Gharar refers to speculation that involves absolute or excessive uncertainty in business transactions. Deceit or fraudulent activities are examples of absolute uncertainty while a subprime mortgage is an example of excessive uncertainty. To achieve the Islamic objective in banking, of ensuring fair and equitable conduct, there should not be any uncertainty that could cause severe losses to one party and unjustied enrichment of the other party. Thus any transaction that comes with a gharar element is prohibited in Islamic banking. Other than the above mentioned prohibited activities, Islamic banks are forbidden to be involved with certain activities as specied in Quran. They include business transactions that involve unlawful and unethical activities such as bribery, prostitution, drug abuse, alcohol, pork and gambling (maisir ). Islamic banks, though, still provide products and services similar to those of, both commercial and investment, conventional banks focussing on deposit taking and money lending. However, due to the dierent principles that govern Islamic banks, the terms of the contract used are unique so to achieve Shari'ah compliance.
In understanding Shari'ah in Islamic banking, it is necessary to be aware there are different interpretations of the Quran and Sunnah which has led to inconsistent conclusions on certain issues. To resolve this issue, there are four Islamic schools of thought (Islamic jurisprudence or mazhab ).
1 These approaches are accepted among members of the same community (or in broader categories such as the state or country level) in resolving undecided issues. The use of mazhab should be consistent throughout time in ensuring it is not being abused by Muslims. Note that dierent mazhab may come out with dierent reso-1 Hana, Shai, Maliki and Hambali. lutions on certain disputes. Despite dierent mazhab, the core contents of Quran, mainly religious faith and belief (Aqeedah ) are interpreted in a similar way by Muslims all over the world. In addition, there are authorised Shari'ah scholars in at least each state or country that sit together and discuss uncertain issues related to the Muslim community and Shari'ah laws. The decision from the discussion is referred as a fatwa and must be obeyed by the community. From a banking perspective, the government is responsible for setting up adequate regulatory agencies and appointing Shari'ah scholars, who are ideally equipped with business and banking skills, to resolve issues in Islamic banking.
Competition between Islamic banks, conventional banks and mixed banks
The simplest interpretation of the implications of section 2.1 is that Islamic banks are like conventional banks but subject to an additional set of constraints from Shari'ah law. This implies that Islamic banks will have lower productivity to the extent that Shari'ah law prevents them from undertaking more productive activities available to conventional banks.
2
There are, though, two qualications to this view. First, the simple view implicitly assumes that Islamic banks are producing the same product as conventional banks which, in the eyes of their customers, is not the case. Muslim consumers of Islamic banking services undoubtedly get additional utility from banking provided in a way consistent with Islam.
3 If output is measured using deated revenue, then this should oset the eect of other constraints that might otherwise lower total factor productivity. Second, as suggested by the extent of industry-specic regulation, banks are not like other rms being more acutely subject to potential market failures arising from asymmetric information or incomplete markets.
Eliminating riba and gharar can also reduce potential losses from moral hazard or the absence of eective insurance markets for certain types of risks.
4 Hence, the productivity gap may not 2 Basov and Bhatti (2014) argue Islamic banks may also attract managers with less human capital.
3 See Berg and Kim (2014) for a signalling explanation of the demand for Islamic banking services.
4 Abedifar et al (2013) discuss this at length as well as perform an empirical analysis.
be as large as the simple view suggests. Finally to the extent other activities exist with similar risk-return proles to those industries prohibited as maisir, there is eectively no additional constraint on Islamic banks. Hence the size and even the existence of a productivity gap between Islamic and conventional banks remains an empirical question.
The question of the relative eciency of Islamic banks is particularly acute in markets where both types of banks are in competition. This is the case in both Bahrain, the global centre of Islamic nance (Hassan & Lewis, 2007) , and Malaysia, which is on the way to becoming an international Islamic nancial hub. This is known as the dual-nancial system in Malaysia and the conventional plus system in Bahrain (Yakcop, 2003) . Regardless of their massive growth and success in developing Islamic products, the means to overcome ineciency is limited relative to the conventional banks (Abdul-Majid et al., 2011a ).
In addition, we identify a third type of banks, the mixed banks, which are conventional banks with Islamic subsidiaries. This is distinct from conventional banks oering some 
Previous literature
There is a large literature analysing the bank productivity in general and a growing literature directly comparing the productivity of conventional and Islamic banks. As highlighted in a recent survey by Hughes and Mester (2010) , there are three broad approaches to these problems. First, there is a large set of studies that apply Data Envelopment Analysis or Stochastic Frontier Analysis to estimate productivity and then use regression to analyse the determinants of the dierences. Studies in this group which compare conventional and Islamic banks are comprehensively surveyed by Johnes et al. (2014) . A second, much smaller group analyses dierences in nancial ratios rather than statistics directly matching the economic concept of productivity. Beck et al. (2014) is a recent example. The third group analyses productivity based on directly estimating production functions or their duals. This approach was revitalised by advances in estimating production functions beginning with Olley and Pakes (1996) and continues to evolve rapidly. There are no papers using this third set of techniques analysing Islamic banks or comparing their productivity to conventional banks. Hence in this section, we draw directly on Johnes et al. (2014) and Beck et al. (2013) for the relevant lessons from these branches and provide additional details on a set of studies on Malaysia. Most previous studies analysing productivity dierences between Islamic and conventional banks use data sets across multiple countries, either within a region, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council region, or across regions. A potential concern about these studies is what variation is driving the results? Is it cross bank-type variation or is it variation across markets? Ideally, conditions for all banks in the sample should be identical except for whether the bank is conventional or Islamic but this is harder to justify when combining data for countries with dierent banking regulations and other characteristics. One way to overcome this problem is to study banks within one country or similar countries. There are several sets of studies analysing productivity in Malaysia. Abdul-Majid, Saal, and Battisti (2011a; 2011b) analyse Malaysian commercial banks by comparing the Islamic banks with the conventional banks in their cost eciency and productivity change. They nd Islamic banks have greater input requirements than conventional banks. Furthermore, conventional banks with an Islamic window, have greater input requirements than conventional banks without one. However, the ndings also reveal that full-edged Islamic banks have more rapid productivity growth. It is important to note though that their study uses data from 1996 to 2002. This is before the arrival of the mixed banks and also shortly after a set of mergers which they nd also increased costs. More recently, Wasiuzzaman and Gunasegavan (2013) examine nancial ratios and perform a basic regression analysis of returns nding conventional banks had a greater average return on assets but no signicant dierence in the regression analysis. There are no published studies specically on the Bahrain banking system.
Estimating Productivity for Banking
In this section we present the two main approaches to estimating productivity that we use: the Olley-Pakes and Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer approaches. We introduce the Olley-Pakes approach rst, followed by the Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer critique of its identication and their own estimation approach. The ACF approach is preferred on a priori grounds because of its stronger identication. It is interesting to see if the results from the two approaches dier though as, strictly speaking, successful estimation using the OP approach requires there to be mis-specication.
The Olley-Pakes method is motivated by three issues: the endogeneity of inputs, rm exit (selection) and unobserved productivity dierences across rms. The Olley-Pakes approach is demonstrated with the Cobb-Douglas production function as in equation (1):
where y it represents the output for rm i at time t, l and k are the rm inputs of labour and capital respectively. Note that inputs and output are logged and there are two unobservable terms to the econometrician in the equation, ω it and η it . ω it is the rms' productivity shock at time t which is known by the rm when making its labour and investment decisions. η it is the error term which is not observed by the rm until after all inputs are chosen. The OP methodology assumes that the productivity term evolves exogenously following a rst-order Markov process, as follows:
where I it is the information set for rm i at time t. Hence productivity is modelled as follows:
OP assume that capital is a state variable which evolves following an investment process.
With d as the depreciation rate and i it as investment, capital at time t, is derived using equation (4):
The assumption that capital stock is determined at period t − 1, using the information set I t−1 , helps in solving an endogeneity problem for k it . On the other hand, labour is not a state variable and it is assumed to be a non-dynamic input. The choice of labour does not have an impact on the rm's future prots. Labour is chosen for each period without restriction from previous periods. l it is decided at t and is correlated with ω it . Since ω it , the productivity shock, inuences the management decision on labour, OLS estimation of equation (1) produces biased and inconsistent estimates. In order to counter the endogeneity issue, Olley-Pakes uses a proxy variable, investment, to control for the unobserved productivity shock and produce consistent estimates of the coecients. Investment is modelled as a function of capital and productivity as shown in the following demand function:
Note that prices are allowed to vary across time, but not across rms since they operate in the same input markets. Investment made by the rm is assumed monotonically increasing with its productivity. With this assumption of a strictly monotonic relationship between i it and ω it , the unobservable productivity variable, ω it can be inverted and expressed as the function of the state variable, capital, and investment, as in equation (6):
Substitution of equation (6) into equation (1) yields:
OP demonstrate consistent estimates of the production function and total factor productivity are obtained by applying a two stage semi-parametric estimation approach to equation (7). In the rst stage output is regressed on labour and a non-parametric function of capital and investment yielding a consistent estimate of β l . In the second stage, consistent estimates of the remaining parameters and total factor productivity are obtained using non-linear least squares.
ACF, though, demonstrate a fundamental identication problem with this approach and suggest a modication to overcome it which we now present. The fundamental identication problem arises from the fact that under the above assumptions l it is also a function of k it and ω it making it impossible to separately identify β l in the rst stage. So successful estimation using the OP approach eectively requires some form of mis-specication. The ACF procedure introduces an alternative way to solve the collinearity issue by focusing on the timing assumption for labour. The main idea is to develop dierent information set for the variables of interest. Unlike for the OP model, ACF consider l it an imperfectly variable input chosen at some point in time between period t − 1 and t, say period t − b, where (0 < b < 1). With the assumption that productivity evolves between these sub-periods, a rm's observed labour input is not a function of ω it , but of ω it−b :
Under this assumption l it is not collinear with the non-parametric term since ω it−b cannot generally be written as a function of k it and i it . Unlike investment, labour is determined by ω it−b rather than ω it . The idea of two separate periods, t and t − b is meant to solve the collinearity issues between l it and the non-parametric function. In this situation, labour is chosen earlier without perfect information about productivity at time t and without complete information on productivity, l it moves independently of the non-parametric function. The rst implication of this alternative timing assumption is that equation (6) is rewritten as:
This implies equation (7) is replaced with equation (10):
where the constant term is absorbed into ω t (i it , k it , l it ). Estimation proceeds, as in OP, in two stages. In the rst stage, Y it is regressed on a non parametric function of i it ,k it and l it yielding the following decomposition:
GMM is used in the second stage to estimate β l , β k and ω it . Two moment conditions are required:
which are operationalised in an iterative estimation routine using equations:
where β * l and β * k are estimates of the input coecients in the iterative process,Φ is obtained from equation (11) There is now a very large literature estimating productivity using either OP or the subsequent extension of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP) using materials instead of investment as the proxy variable (see Fernandes (2008) , Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers (2011), and
Arnold, Javorcik, Lipscomb and Mattoo (2012) for examples). However, just a few studies have analysed productivity in banking using these techniques almost all using the Levinsohn-Petrin approach. Nakane and Weintraub (2005) apply LP to estimate how productivity was aected by privatisation in Brazil. Sanyal and Shankar (2011), Martin-Oliver et al (2013) and Koetter and Noth (2013) are other examples. Buch et al (2014) applies both the LP and OP approaches. The present study is the rst study to apply the ACF approach to banking.
Data and Estimation Strategy
We use an unbalanced panel data of 691 annual observations on 74 Malaysian and Bahrain banks over 22 years from 1990 to 2011. The dataset is more recent than many studies particularly those on Malaysia enabling an analysis of the mixed banks.
Denitions and Sources
The denitions of the variables required for estimation are summarised in Table 1 Within the banking productivity literature, dierent choices have been made about how to measure output and which inputs should be included (see, for example the discussion in Berger and Humphrey (1997) ). As is highlighted in the intermediation approach to modelling banks, the main output for banks arises from loans issued such as mortgage, retail and commercial loans. In the intermediation approach banks are considered as nancial intermediaries that collect purchased funds and use labour and capital to transform these funds into loans and other assets. Hence we use total loans as a measure of output. For inputs we use labour and capital. The quantity of labour is measured as the value of personnel expenses. Total expenditure on employees for labour includes wages and salaries, bonuses, social security costs, pension costs and other sta costs such as stock options.
Capital is measured as the value of bank gross xed assets. Reported xed assets are adjusted to include the value of leased assets, the leases of which are reported as o-balance sheet commitments. The inclusion of leased assets is essential in acquiring an adequate value of xed assets in banking to match their output. Bankscope only reports xed assets net of depreciation, N F A. Gross xed assets are recovered from this by dividing by (1 − d) as below:
Calculation of the value of leased assets and the depreciation rate are discussed in more detail in the appendix. Investment is calculated as in equation (16):
A further issue to consider regarding xed assets for calculating investments is the possibility of zero investment and disinvestment. Earlier studies drop zero observations because they are likely to violate the monotonicity assumption required for the inversion of the productivity estimates as in equation (8 Figures One and Two illustrate, using hypothetical data, how this works. As investment is just included in estimation as part of a control function, the scale does not matter as long as the ordering is preserved.
Finally, it is important to note that the observations on inputs and outputs for mixed banks aggregate those for the Islamic and conventional banking activities. It is typically not possible to construct separate data series for Islamic subsidiaries of the mixed banks because of shared inputs with the conventional branches (particularly capital).
Estimation Strategy
As well as estimating production functions, and productivity, using the OP and ACF approaches, to better understand the nature of the data, we also estimate using OLS and a xed eects estimator. In addition, we not only estimate using the full sample but also with two sets of sub-samples constructed by type of bank and by country. In particular, we estimate using separate samples for Malaysia and Bahrain and two separate samples of conventional banks and the combination of Islamic and mixed banks.
The reason for also estimating using these subsamples is because the theory suggests the full sample can only be used for estimating a common production function if all banks in the industry are charged the same price for inputs and all prices move concurrently over time.
Malaysia and Bahrain are likely to have dierent prices for labour and capital given Bahrain is a developed economy while Malaysia is an emerging market. It is expected that the labour is less expensive in an emerging market relative to a developed market. Thus on average it is likely that banks in the less developed country use more labour per unit of capital than in the developed country. That being said, pooling data from Malaysia and Bahrain is probably less problematic than combining many other countries because both have relatively well developed Islamic banking sectors. We also divide the sample according to bank type because the two dierent types of banks may face dierent input prices because Islamic and conventional banks operate based on dierent frameworks and principles. For instance, purchasing of assets (capital) for Islamic banks must comply with Shari'ah principles which does not involve interest charges. Finally, Islamic banking is fairly new and may receive dierent input prices as compared to the conventional banks. Hence, we estimate using both the full sample and each of the subsamples.
Descriptive Statistics
We Table 2 , the descriptive statistics for purely Islamic and mixed banks are also reported separately.
It is important to note that although there is a relatively small number of observations for mixed banks, the mean and median assets for these banks are signicantly higher than those for solely conventional banks and purely Islamic banks. This implies that banks which practice both conventional and Islamic operations are among the largest banks. Furthermore although the standard deviation for mixed banks total assets is double the standard deviation of assets in the full sample, the coecient of variation for mixed banks total assets is the smallest as compared to the conventional and Islamic banks. This statistic demonstrates that mixed banks have less variability in their assets size. The statistics also reveal that mixed banks have distinctively large assets among banks. Both conventional and Islamic banks mean assets are lower than the mean assets for the total sample of 698 observations. Unsurprisingly, purely Islamic banks have the lowest mean assets which indicate Islamic banks are relatively new and smaller than conventional banks in Malaysia and Bahrain.
Furthermore the assets size variation for Islamic banks is small as the coecient of variation is smaller than that for the conventional banks.
The descriptive statistics for output loans shows a similar ranking as for banks total assets. The most loans are issued by mixed banks, followed by conventional and Islamic banks. The same scenario applies to the loans variability for mixed banks with a high standard deviation for loans, but the lowest coecient of variation relative to conventional and Islamic banks. The large value of assets and loans by mixed banks may be due to the sharing of conventional and Islamic products. These banks may use similar or even less inputs to obtain greater output of both products in their operation.
In terms of capital and labour, it is interesting to note the banking industry has very small values in relation to output. This is natural in a services industry, particularly in banking, as their development mainly depends on deposits and funds rather than physical assets and labour. The capital and labour inputs ranges between just 1 to 2 percent of total loans. In addition, investment is the measure of additional xed assets or xed assets disposal (disinvestment). The mean investment is very small relative to banks loans and total assets. However, Table 3 shows that investment is signicantly correlated with bank loans and their growth. This suggests investment is reecting the same underlying process that is driving growth in output.
Results
In the rst sub-section we report the results from estimating the production function. In the second sub-section we calculate and analyse total factor productivity.
Productivity Estimation
Tables 4 and 5 report coecients for estimating the production function using the four methods for all samples and sub-samples. The coecient on labour is positive and statistically signicant regardless of specication and estimation method for all samples and sub-samples.
In most cases, it takes values between 0.6 and 0.9. There is greater variation in the esti- This outcome for xed eects is well known as the xed eects absorb the primarily cross rm variation of inputs that do not vary much over time (Mairesse, 1990) . The dierent outcomes for the capital coecient largely determine the dierent economies of scale implied by the two sets of specications. OLS and ACF suggest there is increasing returns to scale where as FE and OP suggest there is decreasing returns to scale. The nding of decreasing returns to scale is not very plausible particularly as previous studies tend to nd economies of scale in banking (Hughes and Mester, 2010) . Hence, as well as being preferred on a priori grounds, the ACF estimation results seem more plausible. Also, within the Malaysian context, this dierent outcome is important as the Malaysian government has forced banks to merge (Suan and Habibullah, 2014) .
The estimates of the coecients on the Islamic indicator variable are broadly similar across all of the specications. Negative coecients for the group dummy are returned by all methods except FE implying solely conventional banks produce more output with given inputs compared to Islamic plus mixed banks. For the pooled Malaysian-Bahrain sample, the coecient is around -0.6 and statistically signicant suggesting that the Islamic banks are about 45% less productive than conventional banks. When the sample is divided by country, then for the OLS and OP specications, the coecient for Malaysia is statistically insignicant for OP but, for both methods, the coecient for Bahrain is larger and statistically signicant. However, for the ACF specication, the coecients are insignicant in both country samples. For the FE specication, the coecients on the Islamic dummy for the pooled sample and Malaysian subsample are positive and stastistically signicant. It is not possible to separately estimate this coecient for the Bahrain subsample. The reason for all these results is that with bank specic xed eects, the coecient on the group dummy is identied o the banks which switch from being conventional to mixed. This occurs primarily in Malaysia. The descriptive statistics suggest that the switching banks tend to be larger hence the positive coecient on the group dummy. However, the average xed eect for conventional banks is 0.08 whereas those for banks that are Islamic (including mixed banks)
is -0.80. This suggests that the signicant coecient on the group dummy for the pooled sample comes from variation across Malaysia and Bahrain. In Malaysia, there are more large mixed banks which tend to be more productive whereas in Bahrain there are almost no mixed banks.
For the bank-type subsamples, the results dier across the specications. For OLS, the average productivity is higher for conventional banks whereas for the FE specication it is the other way around. We discuss the dierence in productivity estimates in more detail in the next section.
Estimates of Total Factor Productivity
Descriptive statistics of the total factor productivity estimates are provided in Table 6 . The main result is that regardless of the method used, Islamic banks have lower productivity than conventional banks. The gap is quite substantial mostly between 50 and 65%. The dierences across the samples tends to be greater than the dierences across techniques within samples and seems mainly driven by Malaysia. In Bahrain, all four methods yield a productivity gap of between 63% and 70% whereas for the Malaysian sample the estimates range from 40-45% (FE and OP) to 50% (ACF and OLS). There is also about a 63% gap for the pooled sample but between ACF (59%) and FE (67%). Except for Bahrain (which has only one mixed bank), the comparison between mixed banks and conventional banks depends on the technique used. For OLS and ACF the averages are very close whereas for OP and FE, mixed banks are substantially more productive.
The results for the samples by bank-type are also of interest. In the sample of conventional banks the mean and standard deviations are almost identical for Malaysia and Bahrain for all four methods. Although Malaysian banks have a slightly higher average productivity than Bahrain conventional banks, the dierence is extremely small. This is striking as the two countries are in many respects quite dierent. This result is consistent with technology diusing fairly quickly in competitive markets across dierent countries. For the sample of Islamic and mixed banks, Malaysian banks are on average more productive for all four methods. The fact that Islamic banks in Bahrain have greater variability in productivity than Islamic banks in Malaysia suggests this is not just because of there being more mixed banks in Malaysia. and after they became mixed is interesting. After becoming mixed banks, the median productivity growth is much higher than before. While median productivity growth was lower in the mixed banks than for Islamic banks before they became mixed banks, the pre-mixed banks median growth rate was higher than that for the conventional banks that remained conventional banks. After the banks became mixed banks, the median productivity growth is even higher than the Islamic banks.
Finally, in Table 8 , we compare, using the OP and ACF estimates of total factor productivity, the level and growth before and after each solely conventional bank established a full-edged Islamic subsidiary for the 12 mixed banks in Malaysia. Note that, there is only one mixed bank in Bahrain and due to insucient data the growth comparison of this bank is not informative. The median growth between these two periods reveals that on average growth is higher after the solely conventional banks became mixed banks. Recall that mixed banks are largest in size. In addition, we have also conrmed the ndings of the earlier literature and most theoretical predictions that Islamic banks tend to have lower productivity than conventional banks and the dierence is substantial. However, the dierence is narrowing as Islamic bank productivity tends to grow more quickly than that for conventional banks. Finally, even though the four estimation approaches tended to yield broadly similar results, the ACF approach, which returns increasing returns to scale, is the preferred approach.
Conclusions
The present study analyses banks productivity comparing Islamic and conventional banks in Malaysia and Bahrain. The study uses nancial data from both countries from 1990 to 2011 consisting of 691 observations. In estimating bank productivity, we use four approaches to estimating production functions: ordinary least squares, xed eects, the Olley-Pakes are driven by cross-country rather than cross-type variation. Finally, it uses relatively recent data which enables analysis of a relatively new and distinctive way of delivering Islamic banking services the mixed bank. In summary, the study reveals that bank productivity is associated with oering a range of products to generate more output. This is one advantage of mixed banks which is not accessible for purely Islamic banks that need to compete with many other banks (solely conventional and mixed banks These results are from the Malaysian and Bahrain samples Continued over the page 
